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UNITED STATES v. McGOFF: CAN LAWYERS BE
TAUGHT HOW TO READ STATUTES?
By Reed Dickerson*
Introduction
Early in February 1988, a Federal court judge whom I highly
esteem told me about a case involving a fascinating problem of
statutory interpretation. The case was United States v. McGoff.1
What intrigued me was the question that he then asked: "How
would you have voted?" After reading the case, I thought I
should at least give it a try. I did and got more problems than I
bargained for.
Having vented my prejudices with much satisfaction later in
this article, I have tried to follow through by writing what, by my
lights, would be the "ideal" opinion. I have most certainly failed,
even though as a retiree I have more time to review and criticize
than is accorded most lawyers, judges and law clerks. I place my
opinion next, because it offers a simpler introduction to my more
sweeping critique, which would have been confusing without it.
Altogether, I found the exercise worthwhile because it con-
firmed reservations that I have long entertained about the state
of statutory interpretation in this country.
Following is my estimate of what a full court should say on
rehearing.
The "Ideal" Opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANT V. JOHN PETER
MCGOFF, RESPONDANT
PETITION FOR REHEARING (LET US SUPPOSE) IN THE
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).
A.B., Williams (1931); LL.B., Harvard (1934); LL.M. (1939),J.S.D. (1950), Colum-
bia; LL.D. (hon), Indiana University (1987). Author, The Interpretation and Appli-
cation of Statutes (1975), The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting (2d ed 1986).
Commissioner for Indiana, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Founding Director, Institute for Legal Drafting (Indiana University).
This effort benefitted from comments by Judge Eugene A. Burdick; Professors Pat-
rick L. Baude, Craig M. Bradley, Daniel 0. Conkle,James Willard Hurst, F. Thomas
Schornhorst, and David M. Skover; and attorney Frederic P. Houston.
1 831 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DIsTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 87-3005 Argued (let us suppose) August 17, 1990
Decided (let us suppose) November 4, 1990
Judge Meant:
This concludes a rehearing by the full court on the issues
resolved by the three-judge panel (one judge dissenting) that first
heard the appeal from the judgment of the District Court.2 It
presents an issue of first impression. The facts are simple and the
statutory text in question, consisting of two short provisions of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621, is
relatively simple. The legal problems are not.
John Peter McGoff is charged with violating sections 612(a) and
618(e) of the Act by failing to register with the Department of
Justice as an agent of a foreign nation when he served the Republic
of South Africa from 1974 to 1979. s The following facts are
stipulated:
1. McGoff served as an agent until June 13, 1979.
2. He never registered as an agent.
2 Id.
3 The Act states:
Any person who-
(1) willfully violates any provision of this subchapter or any
regulation thereunder, or
(2) in any registration statement or supplement thereto or in any
statement under section 614(a) of this title concerning the distribution
of political propaganda or in any other document filed with or furnished
to the Attorney General under the provisions of this subchapter willfully
makes a false statement of a material fact or willfully omits any material
fact required to be stated therein or willfully omits a material fact or a
copy of a material document necessary to make the statements therein
and the copies of documents furnished therewith not misleading, shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both,
except that in the case of a violation of subsection (b), (e), or (f) of
section 614 of this title or of subsection (g) or (h) of this section the
punishment shall be a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for
not more than six months, or both.
Failure to file any such registration statement or supplements
thereto as is required by either section 612(a) or section 612(b) of this
title shall be considered a continuing offense for as long as such failure
exists, notwithstanding any statute of limitation or other statute to the
contrary.
22 U.S.C. §§ 618(a), (e) (1983).
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3. The Government has been investigating his relationship
with South Africa since August 1979.
4. He has not waived his right to be protected by the statute
of limitations.
5. No discernible event has tolled the running of that statute.
The Department of Justice learned about McGoff's arrange-
ment with the South African government late in 1978. After investi-
gation, the Department filed a criminal information in 1986.
McGoff pleaded the 5-year statute of limitations.
The issue on rehearing is: When did the statute of limitations
begin to run? The meaning of the statute of limitations being clear,
our answer depends on how we read sections 612(a) and 618(e) of
the Registration Act, which define the crimes and thus regulate their
duration.4 The District Court found for McGoff. The three-judge
panel of this court affirmed, with one judge dissenting.
We have evaluated the arguments on both sides and conclude
that the matter cannot be satisfactorily resolved until further infor-
mation has been obtained and evaluated.
Section 612(a) of the Act provides:
No person shall act as an agent of a foreign principal un-
less he has filed with the Attorney General a ... registration
statement . . . as required by subsection [] (a) .... [E]very
person who becomes an agent.., shall, within ten days there-
after, file with the Attorney General .... a registration state-
ment.., as required by subsection (a) .... The obligation of
an agent... to file ... shall, after the tenth day of his becom-
ing such agent, continue from day to day, and termination of
such status shall not relieve such agent from his obligation to
file a registration statement for the period during which he
was an agent of a foreign principal.5
Section 618(e) provides:
Failure to file any such registration statement . . . as is
required by... section 612(a) ... shall be considered a contin-
uing offense for as long as such failure exists, notwithstanding
any statute of limitation .....
When does the statute of limitations begin to run? For a "con-
tinuing crime," which is how section 618(e) characterizes section
4 Id.
5 Id. § 612(a).
6 Id. § 618(e).
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612(a), the statute runs from the last day of the crime." Here there
are two widely overlapping crimes: (1) the crime of acting as agent
without registering the relationship; and (2) the crime of failing to
register. These crimes extensively overlap, because during the life
of an agency they produce for most agents almost identical results.
But there is a critical difference.
The first crime, which begins at the end of the 10-day grace
period, can trigger the statute of limitations no later than the last
day of the agency, because it is impossible to act (without register-
ing) under an agency that no longer exists. So far as McGoff is con-
cerned, there is no basis for contention here. Whatever questions
might otherwise have arisen respecting the crime of acting as an un-
regulated agent, they were mooted by the running of the statute of
limitations.
The second crime, which also begins at the end of the grace
period, appears capable of continuing beyond termination of the
agency status, as expressed by the provision creating an obligation
to file a statement covering the period during which he was such an
agent. The remaining questions are: (1) Does the statute so provide
for the crime of non-filing; and (2) if it does, how long is the crime
intended to continue?
The wording of section 612(a) (second sentence) leans strongly
toward a registration requirement that continues beyond the life of
the agency. This interpretation is correct, not only because of the
language used, but because it is highly plausible to assume that an
agent's actions during the agency may portend future difficulties
well within the legitimate concerns of the Government. This as-
sumption is supported by section 615, which requires an agent to
preserve prescribed records for 3 years following termination of the
agency." We see nothing in the statutory language to suggest
otherwise.
The panel majority's reasoning to the contrary is unconvincing.
This is well illustrated by its treatment of the modifier in section
612(a) ("for the period during which he was an agent of a foreign
principal").9 The rule of lenity requires that reasonable doubts be
resolved in favor of the accused." A reasonable doubt may consist
7 Id.; see also Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
8 22 U.S.C. § 615 (1983).
9 Id. § 612(a).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Universal Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
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of a significant ambiguity." Is there such an ambiguity here? One
plausible alternative is to read the concluding clause as modifying
"statement" to spell out a continuing obligation to register even be-
yond termination of the agency.
The competing alternative, honored by the panel's majority
opinion, is to read the concluding clause as modifying, not "state-
ment," but the earlier conceivable referent "obligation." This was
rationalized as preventing anyone from reading the concluding
clause to provide that an agent's failure to register during his agency
would automatically be forgiven by the mere expiration of the
agency. Otherwise, the clause is surplusage and therefore presuma-
bly unintended.
This reading fails substantively because the "problem" that it
solves imputes to Congress the intent to deal with an alternative so
implausible as to render the matter a non-problem. It fails textually
because it works only if "for" is read as "during" in a context in
which the close proximity of "for" to "during" creates the powerful
implication that the draftsman, knowing the difference, was signify-
ing that "for" referred, not to duration, but to a functional relation-
ship between foreign agents and the Government with respect to
which people such as McGoff were obligated to register.' 2 This
forestalls the ambiguity.
Assuming that the panel's analysis is sound, the final problem is
duration. There is ambiguity here, but the main problem is ulti-
mately one of vagueness. Respecting ambiguity, one possibility is
that the crime continues in perpetuity and that the statute of limita-
tions is thereby tolled forever for the person who never registers.
For the literalist, this is arguably persuasive. Literalism, however,
should yield to the forces of context, which strongly suggest that the
Government's interests in surveillance do not normally pursue the
agent to his grave. But this analysis may take us beyond the existing
evidence.
The alternative is to explore the possibility of fixing a day ap-
'' Id.
12 Ironically, if "during" is substituted for "for," the former introduces new re-
dundancy ("during the period during which.. ."). Why fight surplusage with fur-
ther surplusage? Actually, making express what is probably implied is not
necessarily surplusage if it serves the purpose of greater clarity. In any event, any
presumption against it is too weak to override otherwise clear, plausible language,
especially in a drafting tradition that is laced with surplusage.
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propriate to the purposes of the statute. The clue is the common-
law principle that "continuing offenses do not, in general, continue
indefinitely." 3 This easily suggests the plausible legislative as-
sumption, grounded in external context, that tolling the statute
need not be delayed any longer than is appropriate to the Govern-
ment's need to know. Here is vagueness.
Resolving this vagueness involves only a conventional exercise
in judicial line-drawing (or zone-of-uncertainty sketching) involved
in applying the concept of a reasonable post-agency period during
which the Government needs to know about past agencies. Accord-
ingly, the trial court should take evidence from the Government re-
specting what it needs to know about foreign agents generally, or
perhaps this kind of agent, and how long it prudently needs to con-
tinue surveillance. But a word of caution: To prevent governmental
bootstrapping, the trial court should insist on a clear and persuasive
presentation by the Government.
Is this law-making rather than law-finding? The case probably
straddles a borderline which may be drawn only loosely. If we have
otherwise exhausted the resources of meaning, we must now exer-
cise our broad judicial power to make law in areas where meaning
has failed. Here, the law-making is clearly ancillary to our law-find-
ing function. This is the kind of judicial activism of which not even
the most conservative jurisprudent can complain. Specifically, we
must dovetail a continuing, but not necessarily perpetual, crime with
the statute of limitations. If a literal reading is appropriately re-
jected, we must either (1) draw a line beyond which the Government
is presumed to have no significant interest in knowing about a regis-
tered foreign agent (which probably constitutes modest ex post facto
law-making); or (2) find that, wherever such a line could reasonably
be drawn, McGoff would or would not, under the circumstances, be
protected by it.
For constitutional purposes, the significant question is not
whether the action taken is ex post facto (which it obviously is) or
whether it involves some element ofjudicial creativity (which it obvi-
ously does), but whether it unfairly surprises the persons to whom
the rule is addressed.
Is such an approach fair to the defendant? We have here a
crime malum prohibitum, and elementary wisdom tells us that people
13 United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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accused of such a crime should be given "the benefit of the doubt."
But the benefit of what doubt? What relevant considerations are un-
constitutionally "ex post facto" here?
We take for granted that potential criminals do not ordinarily
read the relevant statutes before they act. Rather, the test of fair-
ness is the potential criminal's opportunity to know. What would
the potential criminal learn if he or his representative, relying on
accepted methods of communication, read the relevant statute?
The critical information, of course, is the scope of the crime,
spatially and temporally, as he can glean it from the statute by the
standards of cognition that inhere in communication and therefore
makes its potential impact before he acts. More specifically, the
danger of unfair surprise arises from judicial law-making only with
respect to matters that the potential criminal would reasonably be
expected to take into account.
A curious agent, actual or potential, would naturally want to
know what is forbidden and what, inferentially, is permitted. Here,
the statute makes clear that an agent has a duty to register that out-
lasts the agency. The only doubt is its duration. Any reasonable
person, knowing what is decently clear, could not conscientiously
contend that the Government lost all interest in him immediately
upon termination of his agency. He would either accept the possi-
bility of a perpetual duty to register or anticipate that a line marking
its termination would be drawn. Precisely where the line would be
drawn in his case is not the kind of information on which people
normally rely before they act.
Ordinarily, where a judicial attempt is made to estimate with
precision, people who tread close to the line of ultimate criminality
tread at their own risk. No such problem exists here. We have only
its converse: an acknowledged criminal who may be treading close
to the line of ultimate non-criminality. Surely, there is no constitu-
tional interest in protecting criminals against the risk that they may
unwittingly become law abiding. In any event, McGoff was ade-
quately warned, through an arguably plausible literal reading of sec-
tion 612(a), that his continuing duty to register might even be
permanent. The greater risk includes the lesser.
No threat to constitutional protection against self-incrimination
exists here, because the criminal information rests wholly on infor-
mation gathered independently of any disclosure required by sec-
1991]
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tion 612(a). What the result would otherwise be need not concern
us here.
In this case, seven years elapsed between the end of the agency
and the criminal information. After deducting five years for the stat-
ute of limitations, we are left with a period of two years, following
termination of the agency, within which the Government may or
may not have lost legitimate interest. Can it establish that two years
was within the agency's normal span of significant interest in post-
agency surveillance? If so, the Government wins. If not, McGoff
wins. If there is significant doubt, the "rule of lenity" applies. Un-
fortunately, critical facts relating to normal Governmental needs are
missing. Again, a word of caution: To prevent governmental boot-
strapping, the trial court must insist on a persuasive presentation. It
is possible, of course, that on further investigation of the Govern-
ment's needs the trial court may find that the Government's legiti-
mate concern is permanent.
What about the third stipulation of fact, that the Government
"has been investigating McGoff's relationship with South Africa
since August 1979," when it discovered the agency relationship and
perhaps additional information from other sources? The stipulation
does not provide the information we need, which is the duration of
its probable continuing interest in a hypothetical agent who failed to
disclose the kind of information required by the statute. The total
information actually gleaned from the other sources may have gen-
erated a legitimate interest of far greater duration than that nor-
mally generated by the minimum requirements of formal
registration. If this point is invalid, the statute of limitations was
effectively tolled by the stipulation and the District Court's decision
should simply be reversed.
What about section 615, which requires an agent to keep "such
books of account and other records" as the Attorney General speci-
fies and preserves them for three years following termination of the
agency?' 4 This, too, may be inconclusive of the duration of the
Government's general interest in keeping tabs on ex-agents with re-
spect to the kinds of information required by the Act. Nevertheless,
the trial court should take it into account.
The approach adopted here strikes a fair balance between the
lower court's evisceration of what seems to be sound Government
14 22 U.S.C. § 615 (1983).
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post-agency policy and the acceptance of a needlessly protracted
tolling of the statute of limitations in the case of agents who never
register. It does no violence to what the statute makes reasonably
clear and it requires only the mildest kind of supplemental judicial
activism. Finally, it imposes no danger of unfair surprise, because it
operates in an area of information that is highly remote from any-
thing that could upset the expectations of any but the most excep-
tional potential criminal.
Contingent on the Government's offer of proof, the judgment
of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. If the Government does
not make this offer, the judgment is affirmed.
General Comments on the District of Columbia Circuit's Opinion
The striking aspect of the McGoff case is that at the outset
neither judge stated a resolvable central issue. The agreed-on
issue was a non-issue, because it rested on only one viable op-
tion: The statute of limitations starts to run when the agency
ends.
The competing option? Both opinions said that it was that
the statute starts to run when the agent ultimately registers. That
option does not exist here, because McGoff never registered.
The option cannot exist, because, with the facts having been dis-
closed from other sources, it is certain that he never will register.
As a result, the parties in effect tried the wrong issue.
Both opinions are far too long. The majority opinion is re-
petitive, contradictory, badly organized, and loaded with irrele-
vant case law and discussions that ornament rather than advance
the reasoning. 5
Both opinions illustrate the chronic failure of the judiciary to
understand the realities of statute making and especially of the
cognitive process from drafting to interpretation. This is re-
vealed most clearly in the handling of legislative history.
There is also significant want of ability to explicate rigor-
ously. This inability to read statutes and regulations is traceable
ultimately to an inability to draft adequately.
Lawyers are trained thoroughly in the art of persuasion.
15 Also, its attempt to summarize the relevant principles of interpretation seems
highly simplistic. See McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071 at 1076-77.
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They are trained meagerly in the legal disciplines that require
systematic thinking unencumbered by the exigencies of advocacy
or by a preoccupation with making social policy, which is foreign
to a professional drafting tradition that, with respect to policy
making, plays only the role of midwife.
What we conventionally call legal "reasoning" is often, if not
usually, reasoning deformed. The faults in this instance lie not
so much with two well-intentioned, thorough, and (by current
legal standards) well-equipped judges, as with the inertia of a
warped legal tradition. The ultimate lack rests with the law
schools, which still handle the problem with benign neglect, a
neglect that also extends throughout the broad field of
legislation.
Somehow the majority opinion also manages to find, in sec-
tion 611 (c)'s prescriptions for registration statements, a negative
implication arising out of the section's "focus on ongoing relations
between agents and principals," to the effect that the statute is
unconcerned with the static state of post-agency failure to regis-
ter. 16 Context does not support this reading. The opinion then
concedes that section 612(a) "cuts in favor of the Government's
interpretation." 17 The only thing that the majority can find to
"muddy the interpretive waters" is the "dangling" phrase, "for
the period during which."'" Its whole rationale breaks down
there.
In trying not to "eviscerate" the concluding termination
clause, the majority opinion eviscerates the very plausible (and at
least otherwise clearly expressed) Government interest in post-
agency surveillance.
The phrase "notwithstanding any statute of limitations,"
which concludes section 618(e), is explained as heading off any
notion that the statute of limitations might be triggered when the
offense first began.' 9 Instead, the "notwithstanding" clause was
simply a drafting ineptitude that states the obvious: that the stat-
ute of limitations (which is inherently incapable of controlling the
event that triggers it) did not curtail the duration of the continu-
ing offense of failing to register.
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The majority tried to reinforce its position by reasoning that,
because the statute referred only to "agents," it excluded per-
sons who were no longer agents. 0 A more precise text might
have said "ex-agents,"but in this context "agent" is a plausible
synonym for "ex-agent."
The dissent is shorter and includes fewer things to carp
about.
The dissent first recognizes that section 612(a) formulates
two crimes: (1) action as an agent without registering (first sen-
tence); and (2) the failure to register after becoming an agent
(second sentence). 2 ' This seems accurate. Then it declares,
"[T]hese two sentences are not redundant. '2 2 This is true if (and
so far as) they differ. How do they differ? This is worth
exploring.
Despite almost complete substantive redundancy as far as
persons such as McGoff are concerned, the second sentence does
not create it, because a formulation in terms of registration is
necessary to create something that can survive into the post-
agency period to carry out the purposes of section 612(a). That
leaves the question whether, instead, the first sentence is
redundant.
Notice that whereas the first crime is directed to a person
who "acts" as agent, the second crime is directed to a person
who "becomes" an agent. This distinction recognizes that a per-
son can, by contract, become an agent without immediately, or
ever, serving under it. Suppose McGoff had signed an agency
contract but, for some reason, never served. Would this have
prompted the Government to set up a surveillance mechanism?
Because there are practical limits to which even the Federal Gov-
ernment can indulge its legitimate curiosity, it might not. On the
other hand, what is usual should not jeopardize the Govern-
ment's capacity for dealing with the unusual. There is no reason,
therefore, to limit the reach of the second crime to the reach of
the first. A restrictive reading of the second sentence would con-
form to neither the wording of, nor the policy behind, section
612(a).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 1098.
22 Id.
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Fortunately, these speculations are not directly relevant
here, because McGoff's agency status was accompanied by
agency action.
The discussion so far assumes that McGoff's actions
throughout the agency were sufficiently continuous to constitute
a single "continuing crime," which supports the conclusion that
the statute began to run on his actions from the last day he acted
as agent. This assumes that section 618(e), which applies to fail-
ure to register and not to agency action without registration, cre-
ated no negative implication. The section could not have
appropriately included the latter, because action under the
agency might well have consisted of a series of discrete transac-
tions, each of which was continuous. In such a case, prosecution
for the first undisclosed continuous transaction, for example,
would be killed off by the statute of limitations separately from,
and of course earlier than, later undisclosed actions. These re-
finements are mooted, a fortiori, by the later running of the
statute.
During the agency, "the duty to register" was a worse one of
two ways of describing a unitary obligation. Accordingly, an ap-
plication of the statute of limitations that is entirely appropriate
to action-without-registration during the period of the agency in-
exorably applied to its corresponding obligation to register dur-
ing that period. On the other hand, the post-agency duty, no
longer serving as a back-up obligation, is sufficiently different,
and therefore severable, to support an independent tolling of the
statute.
So far, this tracks the reasoning of the dissent. Beyond, how-
ever, there is room for divergence, because the dissent may have
misread legislative intent as envisioning an obligation-to-register
in perpetuity.
The dissent says the "statute is silent on when the duty not
to act as an agent without having registered ends ... one might
reasonably presume that... the obligation ends when the agent
ceases acting. "23 But how could this be so? The statute makes
clear that, except for the 10-day grace period, the obligation not
to act without registering is permanently in place.24
23 Id.
24 22 U.S.C. § 618 (e), (g) (1983).
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The dissent refers to "the rule of the last antecedent, ' 25
which is not a rule, but a syntactical rebuttable convention.
The dissent characterizes the interpretation as "logical. 26
That it uses the word four times in quotation marks suggests that
it is warning the reader that the term is used in a special (and
unexplained) sense. "Plausible" without quotation marks would
have been more apt and less mysterious.
On the other hand, the dissent did see the futility of shifting
an unchanged modifier to an earlier object and the implausibility
of envisioning an intent to forestall the highly improbable risk
that the statute could otherwise be read as dissolving criminal
accountability (for undisclosed activity during the agency) merely
by virtue of its termination. "No criminal statute works this
way. "27
The dissent's reliance on case law28 that interprets other
statutes involving continuing crimes merely begs the question
whether the statute contemplated a crime that continued in
perpetuity. Triggering the statute of limitations by late filing is
simply a non-contingency in any case in which the defendant
never discloses but the facts are otherwise disclosed.
In any event, cases that interpret statutes functionally unre-
lated to the statute being interpreted are rarely relevant during
the search for statutory meaning. 29 Indeed, citing cases to estab-
lish principles of cognition is like citing cases to establish the lo-
cation of Samarkand. Uniqueness is the rule here. In general,
why are courts paranoid about dispensing with unneeded, even
irrelevant case law? In this case, which involves 98 percent expli-
cation and 2 percent conventional law-making, I see little or no
need to cite case law.
Although the majority opinion expresses a wholesome skep-
ticism of using legislative history to find meaning, it sifted a lot of
it, only to find little of relevance or reliability. Certainly, as it
points out,3 0 the expressed intent of a single legislator carries lit-
25 United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1101.
28 See id. at 1102.
29 The majority's reliance on Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S.
974 (1986), is a prime example. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1083.
30 Id. at 1090.
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tie weight when what the court should be looking for is the intent
to be inferred from an institutionalized consensus that is ex-
pressed in a constitutionally prescribed medium.
How a court should handle legislative history depends on
what it is doing. If it is digging for whatever meaning can be
quarried from the statute as it is read in context, legislative his-
tory should not be used to override perceived meaning, although
it may be freely used merely to verify it. The majority seemed
overly eager and maybe a little premature in its investigations.
This risks unfair surprise. The dissent approached legislative his-
tory with healthier skepticism and a higher appreciation of the
limits of verification.
As for using legislative history to make law resolving other-
wise unresolvable uncertainty, most of the legislative history here
contains the very uncertainties that the court was trying to re-
solve. For the most part, legislative history remains the junk food
of hungry interpreters.
Perhaps the most important revelation that emerges from an
examination of how the two opinions handled legislative history
is their woeful lack of understanding of the legislative process.
The majority opinion was comforted, for example, by the fact
that the statute's history concentrated on what happens during
the agency and not on the situation that exists after it ends.3 '
Legislatures simply do not confine their statutory accomplish-
ments to what they concentrate on or talk (or think) about. Avail-
able legislative history is inevitably incomplete and normally only
an uneven smattering of evidence of intent and purpose. Indeed,
the great bulk of the forces at work are often, if not usually, hid-
den from view. Also, it is an elementary fact of communication
that the meaning of what is uttered on any occasion usually out-
runs what is consciously intended. As Holmes once said, meaning
(rather than intent) must control.3 2
Both opinions cite the canons of interpretation as if they
were rules of law, even though many of them are only factual
presumptions of varying weights. The majority opinion also cites
cases to support propositions that can safely be taken for
granted.
31 Id. at 1082.
32 Holmes, The Theory of Legislation, 12 HARv. L. REV. 417 (1899).
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What can we do about a system that produces and tolerates
these conditions? What aspects of a legal education are currently
confronting them or capable of confronting them? A good dose
of legal dialectic could make a big difference. Except where the
judge has shown that he is impervious to reason, the rhetoric of
persuasion should rest on something better than pseudo
rationality.
These comments are meant to indict, not the judges in-
volved, but our woefully unbalanced system of legal education.33
What the Statute Might Better Have Said
Proposed Clarification of Sections 612(a) and 618(e), TITLE
22, U.S.C., CHAPTER 11 - FOREIGN AGENTS AND PROPAGANDA
§ 612(a) Unless exempted by this chapter, a person may act
as agent of a foreign principal only if he files, as they respectively
become due, the registration statement prescribed by this sub-
section and the supplements prescribed by subsection (b). He
shall file the registration statement within 10 days after the day
on which he becomes an agent. He shall file a supplement within
30 days after the end of each succeeding 6-month period follow-
ing the last day of the period prescribed for filing the registration
statement. Statements and supplements must be under oath in a
form prescribed by the Attorney General. Each obligation to file
continues from day to day and, if not met during the agency, it
continues, after the agency terminates, for as long as reasonably
necessary to serve the purposes of this Act ....
(b) Supplements filed under subsection (a) set forth... [con-
forming change]
§ 618(e) [Repeal]
33 Much of what is missing here is described in my books, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975) and MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING (1981).
See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATION HISTORY:
A REVALUATION OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989).
1991]

